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Abstract
This paper shows the existence of an equilibrium pragmatic Lan-
guage with a universal grammar as a coordination device under com-
munication misunderstandings. Such a language plays a key role in
achieving e cient outcomes in those Sender-Receiver games where there
may exist noisy information transmission. The Language is pragmatic
in the sense that the Receiver’ best response depends on the context, i.e,
on the payo s and on the initial probability distribution of the states of
nature of the underlying game. The Language has a universal grammar
because the coding rule does not depend on such speciﬁc parameters
and can then be applied to any Sender-Receiver game with noisy com-
munication.
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11 Introduction
There is an increasing interest in explaining the role of language in human
interactions from Economic Theory and Game Theory (see Rubinstein 1996,
2000; Blume 2005; Blume and Board 2008; Segal 2001; Selten and Warglien
2007; Balinski and Laraki 2007a,b, among others). Why is so? Why would
such research ﬁelds be relevant for linguistic issues? It is well known on the one
hand that Economic Theory and Game Theory deal with regularities in human
interactions and language is one of the more fundamental ones. On the other
hand, both Economic Theory and Game Theory analyze the design of social
mechanims and language can be considered a mechanism of communication.
Language is a symbolic system of communication making it possible the
inference of meaning. When we nowadays communicate by language, our utter-
ances (signals conveying information within a context) have meaning. In fact,
the meaning of a linguistic utterance is not transmitted directly, but is inferred
indirectly by the hearer, through pragmatic insights and the social context in
which the utterance is received. Furthermore, since linguistic communication
became combinatorially richer, then certain markers, alias grammar, started
to be used to disambiguate the communicative context1.
Language helps human beings to coordinate but coordination takes place
many times in di erent environments and in diverse contexts and here hu-
man ”natural” languages may experience some di culties in trying to reduce
ine cient outcomes. For instance, empirical analyses have revealed that the
use of non-standard or non-native grammatical variants only rarely leads to
any communication breakdown, whereas most breakdowns occur due to lexical
or phonetic obstacles2. To explore the role of languages as coordination de-
vices under communication misunderstandings, we design a symbolic language
leading to coordination. The language that we propose is pragmatic in the
sense of Grice (1975). Pragmatics examines the inﬂuence of context3 on the
1These considerations lead naturally to queries about the e ciency of language to com-
municate and learn, inference models of creation of meanings and the role of grammar and
categorization in linguistic structures. Several answers have come from Linguistics (Grice,
1975; G¨ ardenfors, 2000; Azrieli and Lehrer, 2007; J¨ ager, 2007, etc.), Mathematics and Com-
puter Science (Batali, 1998; Nowak and Krakauer, 1999; Smith, 2003; Kirby, 2002, 2007;
Voght, 2005, etc), etc.
2In fact, as reported in Reiter and Sripada (2002), linguists have acknowledged that
people may associate di erent meanings with the same word.
3In Linguistics, a context comprises the speaker, the hearer, the place, the time and so
forth. How the hearer views the intentions of the speaker and how the speaker views the
presuppositions of the hearer are relevant to the understanding of an utterance.
2interpretation of an utterance.
Our context is a Sender-Receiver game where there may be communication
misunderstandings4. To formally develop this idea, our model speciﬁes to an
incomplete information Sender-Receiver game with noisy information trans-
mission. The informed Sender, has to tell the uninformed one, the Receiver,
which action to choose. The set of the Sender’s meanings is the set of the
Receiver’s actions. To communicate the Sender encodes her meanings in a set
of public signals which are sent to the Receiver. Each signal can, in principle,
be anything, for example, letters or merely symbols in an alphabet of salient
features which is used to create signals. Signals could be subject to extrane-
ous factors that would distort or interfere with its reception. This unplanned
distortion or interference is known as noise5. The noise we are concerned with
is such that the messages are always received but they can di er from those
sent by the Sender, that is, signals may be distorted in the communication
process. We model this noise by assuming that each signal can randomly be
mapped to the whole set of possible signals6 and that the language dictionary
is a combination of elements of this set. More precisely, an input sequence is
a concatenation of signals. The Sender utters one of these sequences and the
Receiver hears an output sequence, which is a probabilistic transformation of
the signal string. To isolate the e ect of noise from that of strategic uncer-
4For instance, though native English speakers may remember 80.000 words, very few of
them will use more than 7500 English words in their communication and even in this case
communication misunderstandings may appear.
5Noise refers to anything introduced into messages that is not included in them by the
Sender. Noise may range from mechanical noise, such as the distortion of a voice in the
telephone, to any noise generated in human communication such as semantic, psycholog-
ical or cultural noise. Semantic noise is generated because the ambiguity inherent in all
languages and other sign systems; psychological noise occurs when the psychological state
of the receiver is such as to produce an unpredictable decoding and cultural noise takes
place when the culture or subculture of the audience is so di erent from that of the sender
that messages are understood in ways that the sender might not have anticipated. Such
phenomena are pervaisve in many information transmission processes.
6In economics there are many situations where ”rational” agents have erroneous per-
ceptions, there are signaling models with noise, and, in general, information transmission
models with incomplete information such as those of Crawford and Sobel (1982), Lipman
and Seppi (1995), Koessler (2001, 2004), among others. In many of these models the noise
mainly refers to the strategic uncertainty of the agents about the relevant parameters of
the strategic situation under study rather than communication misunderstandings. Blume,
Board and Kawamura (2007) examines the possibilities for communication in the Crawford
and Sobel’s model in a noisy environment. In linguistics, Nowak, Krakauer and Dress (1999)
investigate the evolution of communication in the presence of noise: individual may mistake
one signal for another.
3tainty, it is assumed that the game is one of aligned interests, where the costs
of miscoordination are di erent in distinct states of nature.
The encoding rule or grammar and the decodiﬁcation rule design a com-
munication device between the Sender and the Receiver. From a given and
common knowledge set of public signals and a communication length, a dic-
tionary or ”corpus” of sequences is deﬁned, generating the set of standard
prototypes which are a one-to-one mapping into the set of Receiver’s actions.
The structure or grammar speciﬁes that each prototype sequence is position-
ally arranged and maximally separated from any other sequence. The Receiver
has to infer a meaning from each heard sequence or, in other words, to assign
an action to each received sequence. Without any noise, the Receiver would
accurately infer the action to play from any received prototype. With noise
each received sequence belongs to the whole set of possible language sequences
and could have been generated from any prototype. Then, the Receiver’s cri-
terion is a best-response decoding which partitions the set of possible language
sequences into subsets, with a unique action assignment to each of them. In
linguistic terms, each of these subset is called the pragmatic variation of a
given prototype.
A Language is deﬁned as the pair corpus and pragmatic variations: the
way in which the Sender transmits the meanings and that of the Receiver’s
understandings. We show that our proposed Language is an equilibrium of the
noisy communication game: an equilibrium coordination device under inter-
pretation failures. To the best of our knowledge we are the ﬁrst ones to present
an equilibrium approach to the design of pragmatic Languages under general
communication misunderstandings. This equilibrium approach is interesting
for several reasons. The ﬁrst one is that it stresses the role of language as a
communication mechanism and hence as a coordination device. The proposed
pragmatic Language facilitating coordination shares the spirit of Balinski and
Laraki (2007)’s work in the Theory of Social Choice. They show that a more
”realistic” model in this ﬁeld, in the sense that messages are grades expressed
in a common language, allows preferences to be aggregated. A recent paper on
the evolution of language is Demichelis and Weibull (2008), were two parties
have a common language and agree on its meaning. They show that such a
shared culture -language and honesty code- facilitates coordination on socially
e cient equilibrium outcomes in strategic interactions. A di erent approach
is Blume and Board (2008) who take it as given that language is an imper-
fect technology that leaves messages subject to interpretation. Contrary to us,
they investigate the strategic use of interpretable messages.
The second reason deals with the structural regularities of languages. The
4grammar of our Language ensures the successful transmission7 of language it-
self and universality guarantees the language implementation in very di erent
contexts. Thus, our work stresses that of Nowak and Krakauer (1999) who
argue that grammar can be seen as a simpliﬁed rule system that reduces the
chances of mistakes in implementation and comprehension and it is therefore
favored by natural selection in a world where mistakes are possible. Our results
also match those of Selten and Warglien (2007), who show in a series of labora-
tory experiments that in an environment with novelty compositional grammar
o er considerable coordination advantages and therefore is more likely to arise.
The third reason is related to communication e ciency. Our pragmatic
Language is an e cient inference of meaning model for a not too short com-
munication length, that is, in spite of initial misunderstandings, the Receiver
is able to infer with a high probability the Sender’s meaning. This result guar-
antees expected payo s close to those of communication without noise. Fur-
thermore, we characterize the time needed to span the pragmatic variations in
order to reduce the chances of misunderstandings and increase expected pay-
o s. A related paper is Cr´ emer, Garicano and Prat (2007), who characterize
e cient technical languages and study their interaction with the scope and
structure of organizations.
Finally, the receiver’s best reply to any pure sender’s strategy induces a
partition of the underlying set of public signals around the standard protoypes
(as conjectured in linguistic studies, see G¨ ardenfors 2000). This partition is
related to the work on categorization based on prototypes (see Azrieli and
Lehrer, 2007, J¨ ager, 2007 and references herein). The closest result to ours is
J¨ ager (2007), who investigates communication in a partnership signaling game
where the set of meanings is equipped with an Euclidean geometrical structure.
Under an evolutionary approach, he shows that the sender’s strategy partitions
the meaning space into quasi-convex categories.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Sender-Receiver
game and the extended noisy communication game. The existence of a lan-
guage supporting players’ coordination is presented in section 3, where the
equilibrium pure strategies for the Sender and the Receiver are constructed. To
highlight the main features of our construction we o er some examples in sec-
7The structure of a language helps to enhance e ciency in communication. In Linguistics
Kirby (2002, 2007) focuses on the emergence of composition and recursion in languages. In
Economics, Rubinstein (1996, 2000) is concerned with the structure of binary relations ap-
pearing in natural language and Blume (2005) explores the use of structure in languages and
how such e cient structures facilitate coordination and learning in repeated coordination
games.
5tion 4. In section 5, the e ciency of our equilibrium for ﬁnite communication
length is measured and the time needed to approach the full communication
payo s is calculated. Some concluding remarks close the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 The coordination game
Consider the possibilities of communication between two players, called the
Sender (S) and the Receiver (R) in an incomplete information game  : there
is a ﬁnite set of feasible states of nature   = { 1,..., | |}. Nature chooses
ﬁrst randomly  j     with probability qj and then the Sender is informed
of such state  j, the Receiver must take some action in some ﬁnite action
space A, and payo s are realized. The agents’ payo s depend on the Sender’s
information or type   and the Receiver’s action a. Let u : A       R be the
(common) players’ payo  function, i.e., u(at, j), j =0 ,1,...,| | 1. Assume
that for each realization  j    , there exists a unique Receiver’s action   aj   A
with positive payo s:
u(at, j)=
 
Mj if at =   aj
0 otherwise
The most8 that players can get without any communication is the max{qjMj}j.
In Sender-Receiver games, players try to share their private information to
achieve coordination and increase their payo s. They usually communicate
using a human or an artiﬁcially constructed language. To communicate the
Sender encodes the meanings to be transmitted in a set of public signals from
the underlying common language. To simplify the model it is assumed that
the set of basic signals is the binary alphabet and that the Sender combines
elements of this set to communicate. Signals may be distorted in the communi-
cation process. This distortion or noise is such that while messages are always
received by the Receiver, they may di er from those sent by the Sender. We
follow a unifying approach to this noisy information transmission and consider
8Suppose that R plays according to the mixed strategy   =(  1,..., |A|) that assigns
probability  t to action at, then the payo s obtained by both players are
 
 j   qj Mj.
Since this expression is linear on  , then the optimal election of the probabilities of   (from
the viewpoint of R) corresponds to a pure strategy (the one corresponding to the vertex j 
such that j  = argmax{qjMj}j).
6that agents communicate through a discrete noisy channel: a system con-
sisting of input and output alphabets, and a probability transition matrix9.
Formally, a noisy binary channel   is deﬁned by:
1. Two sets X = Y = {0,1} as the input and the output basic signal sets
respectively
2. A transition probability p: an input signal s   X is transformed by the
channel in an output signal r   Y with a probability p(r|s). Let  l be
the probability of a mistransmission of the input signal l, then since the
channel is binary p(1|0) =  0 and p(0|1) =  1. The noisy communication
channel is denoted by  ( 0, 1).
We deﬁne next what an informative noisy channel is. The key point is that
the ’informativeness’ of the channel is not related to the probability of properly
understanding each basic signal 0 and 1, but instead to the relation between
these two probabilities, i.e., to the probability of discriminating between input
basic signals once an output basic signal is observed.
Let s be an input signal belonging to some space X, and r a realized output
signal in space Y . Let p(s) be the a priori probability that signal s is delivered
through the channel. The channel transforms s into r according to p(r|s).
From the observed r, input signal s is updated by Bayes’ rule yielding its
posterior conditional probability. Given two output signals r and   r and two
input signals s and   s, it is said that r is more favorable than   r for s, whenever
the posterior odds of inputs s and   s given the output r are at least as high as
those of inputs s and   s given the output   r. Furthermore, the noisy channel
 ( 0, 1) is informative whenever for any realized output signal r and any pair
of input signals s,   s:
p(s|r)
p(  s|r) =
p(r|s)p(s)
p(r|  s)p(  s)  =
p(s)
p(  s).
Whether the channel is informative and which output signals are more
favorable than others are crucial to design the Sender’s set of input sequences
and the Receiver’s decodiﬁcation procedure. Applying the above concepts to
channel  ( 0, 1), where s   {0,1} and r   {0,1} it is obtained (the proof is
given in the Appendix):
Lemma 1 If  0 +  1  =1 , then  ( 0, 1) is informative. Moreover:
9The introduction of noise into a deﬁned channel is well understood in another strand of
literature. Such information transmission has been mainly tackled by Information Theory
tools. Traditional Information Theory, pioneered by Shannon (1948) abstracts away from
equilibrium queries, and focuses on the process of information transmission itself. We will
come back to this appoach in subsection 3.1
71. If  0 +  1 < 1, then for input signal 0, output signal 0 is more favorable
than output signal 1, and for input signal 1, output signal 1 is more
favorable than output signal 0.
2. If  0 +  1 > 1, then for input signal 1 output signal 0 is more favorable
than output signal 1, and for input signal 0, output signal 1 is more
favorable than output signal 0.
Noisy channels are only characterized by their levels of aggregate noise.
Firstly, if channel  ( 0, 1) is informative with low levels of aggregate noise
( 0 + 1 < 1), then the matching between the output and the input signal will
yield a more accurate posterior odds. For symmetric channels, i.e.  0 =  1 =  ,
this condition implies that the misunderstandings are not too high, i.e.   < 1
2.
Nevertheless,  0 =0 .2 and  1 =0 .7 in asymmetric channels also fulﬁl the
condition. Secondly, when channel  ( 0, 1) is informative with high levels
of aggregate noise ( 0 +  1 > 1), then the unmatching between the output
and the input signal will yield now a more accurate posterior odds. Finally,
when  0 +  1 = 1, there is no way to discriminate between input signals once
an output signal is observed and the channel is not-informative. This happens
when   = 1
2 in symmetric channels, or, for instance, when  0 =0 .1 and  1 =0 .9
in asymmetric ones.
Communication goes on for n periods. It is also assumed that the channel is
memoryless, i.e., the probability distribution of the output depends only on the
input at that time and is conditionally independent of previous channel inputs
or outputs. Then, given a communication length n, the Sender utters to the
channel an input sequence, x   Xn = {0,1}
n, which is a concatenation of basic
binary signals and the Receiver hears an output sequence, y   Y n = {0,1}
n,
which is an independent probabilistic transformation of the signal string. Thus
  is extended by a pre-play phase of communication where the Sender uses
n times the channel  ( 0, 1). Let  n
  denote this extended communication
game, where after the communication stage the uninformed player R chooses
an action from her action space (infers a meaning from y and the game context)
upon observing output sequence y and then payo s are realized.
Since the Sender encodes her meanings in a set of public signals, her strat-
egy in  n
  is a rule suggesting the message to be sent at each  j: a sequence
 S
j   Xn sent by S given that the true state of nature is  j. Each sequence
 S
j is called a standard prototype. The set of standard prototypes { S
j }j is the
corpus.





y, where  R
y speciﬁes an action choice as
a response to the realized output sequence y   {0,1}
n. The action associated
8by R to each sequence, jointly with the context, is the meaning decodiﬁcation.
Then, a Receiver’s strategy is the inference of a meaning for any sequence in the
language, even for those not included in the corpus. An univocal construction
of meanings partitions the set of output sequences Y n into | | subsets, each of
them bringing together all the sequences whose meaning is the choice of action
  aj, j =1 ,..., | |. Each subset of this partition is the pragmatic variation
associated to a particular standard prototype.
A Language is the pair corpus and pragmatic variations: the Sender’s mean-
ing transmission and the Receiver’s understandings. An equilibrium Language
is that for which the players’ strategies are a best response to each other.
Expected payo s in  n
  are deﬁned in the usual way. Let the tuple of the
Sender’s expected payo s be denoted by: { S








for each  j,
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and where p(y| S
j ) is the Sender’s probability about the realization of the
output sequence y   {0,1}
n conditional on having sent sequence  S
j in state
 j.
Let the tuple of the Receiver’s expected payo s be { R






















and where p( S
j |y) is the Receiver’s probability about input sequence  S
j in
state  j conditional on having received the output sequence y.
A pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the communication game is
a pair of tuples ({   S
j }j,{   R
y }y), i.e., a Sender’s corpus and a Receiver’s sets
of pragmatic variations, and a set of probabilities {p( S
j |y)}j for the Receiver
such that for each  j, and for any other strategy    S
j of the Sender,
   
S
j =  
S
j (   
S
j ,{   
R
y }y)    
S
j (   
S
j ,{   
R
y }y),
and for each y   {0,1}
n and for any other Receiver’s strategy    R
y ,
   
R
y =  
R
y ({   
S
j }j,   
R
y )    
R
y ({   
S
j }j,   
R
y ),
where by Bayes rule each p( S

























































































j |y). Denote this common
ex-ante expected payo s by   .
In order to distinguish among sequences, a distance function among them
has to be deﬁned. A natural and intuitive function is the Hamming distance.
Formally, consider two n-dimensional sequence x =( x1,...,xn) and y =
(y1,...,yn). Let I stands for the indicator function. The Hamming distance
between two sequences x,y, denoted h(x,y), is deﬁned as h(x,y)=
 n
t=1 Ixt =yt.
Suppose that n = m | |. For 1   l   | |, the l block of length m
of x =( x1,...,xn) is the subsequence (x(l 1)m+1,...,xlm). The Hamming
distance in the l-th block between x and y, denoted by hl(x,y) is equal to the








Ix(l 1)m+t =y(l 1)m+t
By additivity, the Hamming distance between x and y coincides with the sum
of the Hamming distances of the | | blocks between x and y: h(x,y)=  | |
l=1 hl(x,y).
3 Pure equilibrium strategies under informa-
tive noisy channels.
Our main ﬁnding shows the existence of an equilibrium pragmatic Language,
with a universal structure or grammar. In fact, we show how to construct such
a Language. Language is pragmatic in the sense that the Receiver’ decoding
rule depends on the context, i.e, on the payo s and on the initial probability
10distribution of the states of nature of  . Language has a universal grammar
because the Sender’s corpus does not depend on such speciﬁc parameters of  
and can then be applied to any Sender-Receiver game. Both rules are a best
response to each other, generating an equilibrium Language.
In the noisy communication game  n
 , the cardinality of the set of commu-
nication sequences exceeds that of the set of states of nature. Then, given the
set of basic signals {0,1} and n, a dictionary or ”corpus” of sequences from
{0,1}n is designed by selecting | | of them, one for each state of nature. Each
selected sequence is a standard prototype, { S
j }j {1,...,| |}. Standard prototypes
are constructed by dividing any input sequence (x1
j,...,xn
j) in | | blocks of
length m in such a way that all blocks but the j-th consist of repetitions of
signal 1 and the j-th block is composed of m repetitions of signal 0. For each
realized state of nature, the Sender utters to the channel a standard prototype.
A Sender’s pure strategy is then the standard prototype to be sent at each  j.
For each prototype, the noise induces any output sequence in Y n = {0,1}
n,
say y. Once y is observed, the Receiver chooses his best response. His choice
is based on the following meaning inference procedure: given the noisy infor-
mation transmission, he partitions the set of all possible received sequences
{0,1}n in a collection of subsets which are called ”the pragmatic variation
classes”, denoted by { R
y }y. Each pragmatic variation class is associated to
a particular standard prototype and hence to a particular action. Therefore,
the Receiver will play the action dictated by the pragmatic variation including
output sequence y. Since the Receiver maps the observed output sequence
into prototypes, his best reply to any pure Sender’s strategy induces a kind
of ”categorization”10 of the output space, Y n = {0,1}
n, around the standard
protoypes. Thus, at equilibrium the output message space is partitioned in a
ﬁnite number of sets.
Given that the Sender knows the Receiver’s partition of the output space,
her best response is truth-telling. Speciﬁcally, the Sender has no incentive
to lie uttering an input sequence di erent from the corresponding standart
prototype. This is so because the probability mass of the pragmatic variation
class associated to each standard prototype (and hence to each state of nature)
only decreases by lying. Therefore, the main result states that the transmission
of the corresponding standard prototype (for a realized output sequence) by
the Sender, and the choice of the action suggested by the classes of pragmatic
variations by the Receiver are a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
10Categorization is the way by which a set of entities, identiﬁed with some ﬁnite dimen-
sional Euclidean space, is partitioned into a ﬁnite number of categories. Categories are sets
of entities to which we react in an identical or similar way.
11 n
 . Firstly, we present the Theorem, proven in the Appendix, and then we
show how to construct such strategies.
Theorem 1 There exists an n0   N such that for all n   n0 the pair of
tuples ({   S
j }j,{   R
y }y) and the set of probabilities {p( S
j |y)}jis a pure strategy
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of  n
 .
The partition of the output space in the pragmatic variations of the stan-
dard prototypes is related to the work of Azrieli and Lehrer(2007), who suggest
a categorization model based on prototypes. Our result is also related to J¨ ager
(2007), who analyzes the class of Sender-Receiver games, where the cardinality
of the set of meanings exceeds the size of the set of signals by several orders of
magnitude. He shows that under the replicator dynamics, a strict equilibrium
set is such that for each Receiver’s pure strategy, the Sender’s best reply is a
categorization of the meaning space.
On the contrary, in our noisy communication game, the Receiver’s best
reply to any pure Sender’s strategy induces a categorization of the output
message space around the standard protoypes. This partition is due to an
inference process rather than to an evolutionary dynamics. Thus, noisy com-
munication processes induce pragmatic categorizations of the message space.
Unlike J¨ ager, the players’ utility function reﬂects di erent payo s under dif-
ferent standard prototypes, this meaning that it is the weighted (by expected
payo s) distance what matters for categorization. Our categorization takes
then into account not only the pure similarity or distance to the standard
prototypes but also the expected payo s of game  .
In the sequel, we o er the construction of the pure equilibrium strategies
for the Sender and the Receiver, i.e. {   S
j }j and {   R
y }y, respectively, in  n
  when
the noisy channel  ( 0, 1) is informative with low levels of aggregate noise,
i.e.,  0 +  1 < 1. The remaining case is similar and we omit it.
3.1 The corpus and the pragmatic variations of the stan-
dard prototypes.
One is tempted to look at Information Theory to design the players’ coding and
decoding strategies in our noisy communication game  n
 . More speciﬁcally,
Coding Theory is concerned with the design of practical encoding and decoding
systems to achieve reliable communication over a noisy channel. The general
idea is that the encoding system introduces systematic redundancy into the
transmitted message, while the decoding system uses this known redundancy
12to deduce from the received message both the original source vector and the
noise introduced by the channel11. The basic Theorem of Information Theory
is then the achievability of the channel capacity by a communication protocol
(based on encoding and decoding rules) under the implicit assumption that the
two communicating agents commit ex-ante to following a particular encoding
and decoding strategies before the communication stage.
In game theoretical analysis players are required to take actions when they
are called upon to do so, therefore given an encoding rule and an output
message, the Receiver’s equilibrium conditions summarize the choice of the
action corresponding to that state of nature for which his expected payo s are
higher. Thus, unlike Information Theory, the role of a decoding rule in our
problem is not that of recovering a string potentially perturbed by the noise
channel but instead that of inferring at equilibrium which of the actual | | valid
messages was actually sent through the channel. Since we are interested in
encoding systems supporting equilibria, there is only one feasible decoding rule
which is given by the ’best response’ decoding rule. Obviously, not all coding
and decoding rules12 from Information Theory can generate the conditions
to satisfy the Nash equilibrium requirements. This is so, even when players’
strategies come from a well-established theory guaranteeing a good rate of
information transmission (see, Hernandez, Urbano and Vila, 2009). For this
reason the application of standard encoding systems, which are more e cient
in terms of transmission rates may not be too appropriated when designing
simple and universal encoding systems supporting equilibria.
The next step is to design the encoding13 rule or corpus of the standard
prototypes which is a best response to the Receiver’s decoding. A coding rule
for our problem is a rule assigning a string of n symbols in {0,1} to each state
of nature. We will use a variation of a repetition14 code: the block coding
rule. A general characterization of the Receiver’s best response decoding rule
for any feasible Sender’s corpus would depend of the game parameters, the
11There are mainly two di erent families of encoding rules for binary noisy channels:
repetition codes and linear block codes (where the most known are the Hamming codes).
12Decoding rules associated to standard code systems as for instance either the Hamming
code (7,4) or random codes may not be, in general, best responses to the received string.
13The framework in our paper is quite di erent from that of Coding Theory. In particular,
the number of states of nature (the cardinality of  ), from which one has to be transmitted,
is ﬁxed and usually small.
14Repetition codes generate redundancy by the repetition of every bit of the message a
prearranged number of times. This family of codes can achieve arbitrarily small probability
of error only by decreasing the rate of transmission. However, they are useful for many
practical purposes as, for instance, when universality is a desiderable property.
13noise and the encoding parameters (the interested reader may consult the
authors’ web pages)15. To leave apart the encoding parameters, and focus on
the game theoretical aspects of the problem, we construct an easy and universal
encoding rule allowing a simple characterization (for instance, in terms of the
Hamming distance) of the best response decoding rule, only depending on both
the game and the noise parameters of any Sender-Receiver game with noisy
communication. As it will become clear in the sequel the block coding rule is
independent of the game payo s and of the initial probabilities of the sates of
nature.
3.1.1 The Corpus: Block Coding
The corpus is constructed from the set of basic signals {0,1} and the commu-
nication length. For a given length n, the set of possible utterances is then
{0,1}n. Since each state  j is associated with a receiver’s optimal action   aj,
then, the corpus consists of the | | sequences in {0,1}n given by {   S
1,..,   S
| |}
and each of the | | sequences    S
j is the standard prototype encoding the mean-
ing ”take the action   aj”. The Sender’s pure strategy assigns to each state  j
a tuple    S
j =( x1
j,...,xn
j). Assume that the number of states of nature | | is
a multiple16 of n, i.e., there exists an integer m such that n = m | |.
Since many sequences in {0,1}n are possible, some grammar is needed to
isolate structural regularities. In particular, our language grammar is based
on a block structure which allows us to construct a corpus as follows: each
   S
j   Xn =( x1
j,...,xn





0 if (j   1)m   1   i   jm
1 otherwise
In other words, input sequence (x1
j,...,xn
j) is divided into | | blocks of
length m in such a way that all blocks but the j-th consist of repetitions of
signal 1 and the j-th block is the m-repetition of signal 0. Thus, the structure
or grammar speciﬁes that each prototype sequence is positionally arranged,
that is, in blocks. A ﬁrst property of this grammar is that prototypes have the
maximal separation among them. Furthermore, the block structure permits
the block by block comparison among any sequence y and all the prototypes.
Thus, the relevant information when comparing output sequence y to prototype
15Either http://www.uv.es/penelope/ or http://www.uv.es/urbano/
16If n is not a multiple of m, one may consider m as the integer part of n
[ ]. The remaining
elements would be considered without meaning.
14   S
l is only contained in the corresponding block l. Moreover, all the remaining
prototypes give the same block l-information with respect to  S
l . The following
lemma formalizes this property, where the block Hamming distance between
sequences is the distance measure.
Lemma 2 For all k,k    {1,2,...,| |}, we have that
1. hl(   S
k,y)=hl(   S
k ,y) if k  = l  = k 
2. hk(   S
k,y)+hk(   S
k ,y)=m if k  = k 
The players’ strategies can be understood as a communication protocol.
One of the most desired properties in communication protocol design is uni-
versality. The corpus satisﬁes this property since it does not depend on the
speciﬁc parameters of  , that is, on the payo s and the initial probability
distribution of the states of nature.
3.1.2 The Receiver’s best response: The pragmatic variations of
the standard prototypes.
The Receiver has to take the action in  , after hearing an output sequence y,
which maximizes his expected payo s. Equivalently, for each y he chooses the
action   al(y) such that
| |  
j=1
p(   
S
j |y)u(  al| j)  
| |  
j=1
p(   
S
j |y)u(ak| j),
for any other k  = l which, given both the linearity of the Receiver’s payo 
functions in probabilities {p( S
l |y)}l, l =1 ,...,| |, and the matrix payo s is
equal to p(   S
l |y)Ml   p(   S
k|y)Mk, or
p(   S
l |y)






The next proposition states that given a noisy communication channel   =
{ 0, 1} and an observed output sequence y, the likelihood ratio of any two
standard prototypes, say    S
j and    S
k, can be written in terms of their block
hamming distance with respect to output signal y and of the channel noise
parameters. In the Appendix some easy but cumbersome calculations show
that.
15Proposition 1 For all k,l =1 ,...,| |, k  = l and for all y   Y,
p(   S
l |y)







1    0
 1
1    1
 hl(   S
l ,y)+hk(   S
l ,y) m
(2)
Substitution of (2) in (1) gives an expression which helps the Receiver to
assign each sequence y to one of the standard prototypes and hence to a speciﬁc
action. This assignment is based on both the number of di erent elements
(errors) that each two standard prototype sequences    S
l and    S
k may have with
respect to the observed output sequence y and on the ratio of their associated
expected payo s
Mkqk
Mlql . More precisely, the Receiver’s pure equilibrium strategy
generates ﬁrst a partition of output set Y n around the standard prototypes
based on both the prototype likelihood ratio and their relative expected payo s.
To proceed with the construction of the message space partition, compute
ﬁrst parameters {Clk}l =k, for each l,k   {1,...,| |}, as the integer approxi-










Parameters {Clk}l =k are the ”vicinity bounds”; there are | |   (| |   1) of
them and can be arranged in the following way,
Y1 Y2 Y3 Yl Y| |
 
 
   
   
   
 
 
  C21 C31 ··· Cl1 ··· C| |1
C12   C32 ··· Cl2 ··· C| |2
C13 C23   ··· Cl3 ··· C| |3
··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ···
C1l C2l C3l ···   ··· C| |l
··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ···
C1| | C2| | C3| | ··· Cl| | ···  
 
 
   
   
   
 
 
where each column gives the constraints deﬁning subsets of Y n and with
typical element Clk. Each Clk is an upper bound on the distance between blocks
l and k in y and the corresponding ones in    S
l . Thus, parameter Clk is the
maximum number of permitted mistakes to infer that output sequence y comes
from    S
l instead of coming from    S
k. For a given noisy channel  ( 0, 1) and
communication length n, expression (3) measures the relative expected payo 
loss from taking one action instead of the other. Therefore the minimum over
16the k’s of vicinity bounds {Clk}k, k  = l, is the maximum of such relative
expected payo  losses.
To precisely specify each subset Yl, we divide the set of states of nature in
two subsets:
1. One containing those states k, di erent from states l in expected payo s,
that is qlMl  = qkMk. Let ˜  l = {k   {1,...,| |} such that qlMl  =
qkMk} be such a set17.
2. Another one with the remaining states where their expected payo s co-
incide with those of state l. In this (symmetric) later case, a rule to
break ties is needed. Our rule is the same for every pragmatic variation,
coincides with the length of the block and is independent of both the
noise and the expected payo s.
We are now ready to deﬁne subsets Yl of the partition. Each subset is
determined by vicinity bounds on the number of permitted block hamming
distances (errors)18 between a standard prototype    S
l and the realized output
sequence y.
Yl = {y   Y
n| hl(   
S
l ,y)+hk(   
S
l ,y)   Clk, for all k   ˜  l
hl(   
S
l ,y)+hk
 (   
S
l ,y)   Clk
 , for all k
 
  /   ˜  l , k
 
<l
hl(   
S
l ,y)+hk
 (   
S
l ,y) <C lk
 , for all k
 
/   ˜  l , k
 
>l }
Finally, for each realized y, the Receiver’s pure equilibrium strategy is
   
R
y =   al   y   Yl
It is worth remarking:
1. Given the above description of Yl, and that either Clk + Ckl =2 m   1
whenever qlMl  = qkMk or Clk + Ckl =2 m whenever qlMl = qkMk, sets Yl,
l = {1,...,| |}, are a true partition of Y n (see the Appendix). Therefore, the
Receiver’s best reply to any pure Sender’s strategy induces a categorization of
the output message space Y n = {0,1}
n around the standard protoypes.
2. The necessary condition to have a non-empty Yl is that the sign of all




1  1) is negative, whenever
17Set ˜  l could be empty when, for instance,   had the same payo s at each state and the
priors were uniformly distributed.
18Recall that we are considering informative channels with low levels of aggregate noise,
 0 +  1 < 1. Here, the matching between the output and the input signal yields a more
accurate posterior odds.
17both qkMk >q lMl and the communication length n is very short, i.e., m = n
| |
is not big enough, then the associated Clk may be negative. This will give
rise to not playing at all the corresponding action   al and an e ciency loss. In
section 5, we will show how to cope with this case and improve e ciency by
designing an auxiliary truncated game.
3. Finally, let us specify the size of the standard prototype block, m, in
parameters {Clk}l =k by denoting each of them by Cm
lk. If the communication




















lk grows by a unit whenever the block length m = n
| | increases by one.
This means that as n increases, the vicinity bounds and hence the number of
sequences belonging to each Yl, l = {1,...,| |}, increase as well. This fact
is useful to characterize the time needed to span the pragmatic variations in
order to approach any targeted expected payo s.
The assignment process of the speciﬁc sequences belonging to each Yl is
a little cumbersome but the following examples nicely illustrate the whole
construction.
4 Examples
Example 1. Consider the following Sender-Receiver game   with three states
of nature where nature chooses  j, j =1 ,2,3 according to law q =( q1,q 2,q 3)=
(0.5,0.25,0.25). The set of actions for player R is A = {a1,a 2,a 3}, and payo s













Suppose that the players communicate n = 6 times through the noisy
channel  ( 0, 1) with associated transition probabilities p(1 | 0) =  0 =0 .1
and p(0 | 1) =  1 =0 .6. Thus, the communication channel is   = {0.1, 0.6}
and  6
  is the associated extended communication game.
For each state  j, j =1 ,2,3, the Sender divides the standard prototype
sequences (x1
j,...,x6
j)   X6, in 3 blocks of length m = 6
3 = 2, where the j-th
block, consists of two consecutive 0’s and the other blocks of two consecutive
181’s. Thus, the corpus consists of the Sender’s 3-tuple of standard prototypes:
   S
1 = 001111,    S
2 = 110011 and    S
3 = 111100.
To begin with the partition of output message space Y = {0,1}6, the





















Next, given that for all j =1 ,2,3, qjMj  = qiMi, i  = j, output set Y = {0,1}6
is partitioned by the Receiver in subsets Yl = {y|hl(   S
l ,y)) + hk(   S
l ,y))  
Clk, k,l =1 ,2,3,k = l}, where {Y1,Y 2,Y 3} are deﬁned by the above matrix
as follows:
Y1 = {y   {0,1}6 |h1(001111,y)+h2(001111,y)   1=C12
|h1(001111,y)+h3(001111,y) = 0 = C13 }
Y2 = {y   {0,1}6 |h2(110011,y)+h1(110011,y)   2=C21
|h2(110011,y)+h3(110011,y) = 0 = C23 }
Y3 = {y   {0,1}6 |h3(111100,y)+h1(111100,y)   3=C31
|h3(111100,y)+h2(111100,y)   3=C32 }
Note that the worse expected payo s in states 1 and 2 as compared to those
in state 3, make it both C13 = C23 = 0, i.e., no Hamming distance (mistake)
will be permitted between the observed y and the standard prototype    S
1, if
the Receiver has to assess that y comes from    S
1 instead of coming from    S
3,
and similarly for the standard prototype    S
2.
How to construct the pragmatic variations around the standard prototypes?
Take the minimum of the Clk’s. In our example consider, for instance, Y1,
where this minimum is given by the Hamming distance of any output sequence
y to blocks 1 and 3, i.e. h1(001111,y)+h3(001111,y) = 0. Parameter C13 =0
implies that no error is permitted in blocks 1 and 3 together and hence these
blocks in all sequences belonging to Y1 have to be equal to the ﬁrst and third
blocks, respectively, of    S
1 = 001111, i.e. sequences of the form {00  11}. Now,
let us consider the elements of block 2 of Y1, where C12 = 1. This implies that at
most one error is permitted in blocks 1 and 2 together, but since C13 = 0, this
error can only be in block 2. Hence block 2 in all sequences in Y1 is composed
of the sequences {(1,1),(0,1),(1,0)}. Thus, block 2 permits all the variations
around    S
1. The distance asymmetries among blocks reﬂects the expected
19payo s asymmetries of  . Similar reasoning will give us the set of sequences
in Y = {0,1}6 belonging to Y2. Finally, notice that by lemma 2 and by the
integer approximation C32+C23 =2 m 1   2m and C31+C13 =2 m 1   2m,
and the sequences belonging to Y3 can be easily characterized.














     






     
     
and Y3 = {0,1}6   Y1   Y2.
Then, for each y the Receiver’s pure equilibrium strategy is:
   
R
y =   aj    y   Yj, j =1 ,2,3
and equilibrium expected payo s for n = 6 are:
 
S({   
S
j }j,{   
R
y }y)= 
R({   
S
j }j,{   
R





qjp(y|   
S














qjp(Yj|   
S
j )Mj = 10.96
where p(Yj|   S
j )=
 
y Yj p(y|   S
j ) with p(Y1|   S
1)=0 .083; p(Y2|   S
2)=0 .130 and
p(Y3|   S
3) = 0.994. The ex-ante expected payo s of noiseless communication
are
 3
j=1 qjMj = 13 and the maximum expected payo s of the silent game are
q3M3 = 10.75.
Example 2. Consider the particular case | | = 2, with n = 4, and the
alternative corpus    S
1 = 0000 and    S
2 = 1111 instead of ours (i.e,    S
1 = 0011
and    S
2 = 1100). Further assume that  0 =  1 =  .
Applying our best-reply reasoning to the above corpus, the Receiver’s prag-
matic variations for any received sequence y, when q1M1  = q2M2 are:
Y1 = {y   {0,1}4 |h1(0000,y)+h2(0000,y)   C12 }
Y2 = {y   {0,1}4 |h2(1111,y)+h1(1111,y)   C21 }
19Notice that sets Y1,Y2 and Y3 are a partition of Y . In order for a sequence of Y3 to be
also in Y1, a Hamming distance of 2m would be required. But the maximum distance is
2m   1.
20and the Receiver’s pure strategy is as before:    R
y =   aj    y   Yj, j =1 ,2.
Notice that if   has symmetric expected payo s, i.e., q1M1 = q2M2, then
C12 = C21 = m = n
2, and the Receiver’s best response when she hears a y
will be the well-known majority rule: playing   a1 whenever the number of 0’s
is strictly greater than the number of 1’s and   a2 whenever the number of 1’s is
greater than or equal to the number of 0’s. Nevertheless, when q1M1  = q2M2,
the majority rule will not be a best-response.
5E  ciency Analysis
This section analyzes the power of pragmatic Languages as coordination de-
vices under noisy communication. This analysis entails to ﬁrst assessing its
performance as a meaning inference model, i.e., to bound the size of the poten-
tial wrong inferences of meaning as a function of parameters   and n. Then,
e ciency is analyzed by comparing, for each communication length n, how
close ex-ante expected payo s are to those of reliable communication, thus
providing, for a given expected payo -approximation parameter, the commu-
nication threshold length.
Let   0 be the game where the Sender communicates the realized state
of nature with no mistake, i.e.,  0 =  1 = 0, and let   0 be the associated
ex-ante Nash equilibrium expected payo s where agents play the action pair
with positive payo s, at each state of nature,   0 =
 | |
j=1 qjMj.
Alternatively, the common ex-ante equilibrium expected payo s of our ex-
tended communication game  n
  were denoted by   . To stress the dependence
of such payo s on the communication length n, let us denote them as  n
 . Also,
recall that (see remark 3 before the section of examples) the vicinity bounds
depend on n and so do the pragmatic variations classes, denoted now as Y n
j ,
l = {1,...,| |}. Then,
 
n
  =  
n
 ({   
S
j }j,{   
R
y }y)=












j p(y|   S
j ). Therefore,
  0    
n
  =
| |  
j=1
qjMj(1   p(Y
n
j |   
S
j ))
The di erence between the above expected payo s depends on probabili-
ties p(Y n
j |   S
j ). Each of this quantities measures the probability mass of the
21pragmatic variation of each standard prototype    S
j : the Receiver’s probability
of playing   aj when the Sender utters    S
j in a communication episode of length
n.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding is that our pragmatic Language performs probabilisti-
cally quite well, when n is long enogh, as an inference meaning device, un-
der noisy communication. To show this, we construct an upper bound on
1   p(Y n
j |   S
j )=p(Y n   Y n
j |   S
j ), i.e. the probability of not inferring the action
  aj by the Receiver when the Sender utters sequence    S
j . By deﬁnition of each
Y n
j , this wrong inference takes place whenever some vicinity bounds are not
fulﬁlled, i.e., whenever hj(   S
j ,y)+hk(   S
k,y) >C jk for k   K, where K is any
non-empty subset in {1,2,...,j   1,j+1 ,...,| |}. The following result is
proven in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 Given a noisy communication channel  ( 0, 1) with  0 <  1
and game  n
 , for any n   | |, then
p(Y
n   Y
n
j |   
S
j ) = 1   p(Y
n
j |   
S
j )    
cj+1
1  j( 0, 1)
where cj = min{Cjl|l =1 ,...,| |;j  = l} and  ( 0, 1) is a function on  0 and
 1, for each j.
Notice that for n ﬁxed, (1   p(Y n
j |   S





(1   p(Y n













Therefore the bound of the above Proposition is small whenever cj   0. A
su cient condition for cj   0 is that all vicinity bounds Clk are non-negative,
i.e., whenever,






(1  0)(1  1)
, for all l =1 ,...,| |;j  = l. (4)
We turn next to the e ciency issue. For a ﬁxed communication length n,
a pair of equilibrium strategies ({   S
j }j,{   R
y }y) is  -e cient if:   0    n
     .
For any 1 >   > 0, we o er a threshold length   n such that both the asso-
ciated corpus and set of pragmatic variations support  -e cient equilibrium
strategies.
By Proposition 2 and for n big enough, the di erence between reliable and
noisy communication expected payo s is given by
  0   
n
  =




j |   
S
j )) =




1  j( 0, 1)  





22where cj = min{Cjl|l =1 ,...,| |;j  = l}. Denote   c = min{cj|j =1 ,...,| |},
and assume, without loss of generality, that q1M1   ...   q| |M| |, then the
smallest vicinity bound   c is











Therefore, to get an  -approximation, it su ces that
  0    
n
     
  c+1
1
| |  
j=1
qjMj    







Since ln 1 < 0, a su cient condition is that














  1. (6)
Inserting (5) in (6) and rearranging we ﬁnd that   n is bounded by the
expression,














(1  0)(1  1)
 
. (7)
The minimum length of the communication episode that allows  -e ciency
depends on the relative  -approximation, the biggest amount of noise and the
maximum relative expected payo s loss. Notice that by (4) if the ﬁrst term of
the right hand side of (7) were negligible, then the length   n would coincide with
the minimal length guaranteeing a positive matrix of the Clk’s. Therefore, the
second term of the right hand side is the communication length to generate
non-empty pragmatic variations for all the prototypes. The ﬁrst term adds
then the time needed to span such pragmatic variations in order to reduce the
chances of misunderstandings and increase expected payo s according to the
 -e ciency.
The intuition is clear, as n increases the vicinity bounds increase as well,
spanning the pragmatic variation classes Yl, l = {1,...,| |}. Therefore, the
23communication length n has to be long enough to guarantee that, on one hand,
there are not e ciency losses due to empty pragmatic variation classes, and
on the other, the probability masses of the pragmatic variation classes are
su ciently high to achieve ex-ante expected payo s  -close to those of reliable
communication. This result is stated below.
Theorem 2 Let   > 0, for any communication length n   [  n,  ),
  0    
n
     
We would like to remark that although the corpus works quite e ciently in
most of the cases, there may exist situations where communication is so short
that some prototypes may be unable to generate a meaning. This creates
ine ciencies that could be easily avoided by a reassignment of the signals.
More precisely, in the corpus construction, n
| | out of the available n signals,
those equal to 0, are used to distinguish each standard prototype from any
other else. If there exists a state  j such that Cjk < 0 for any k =1 ,...,| |,
k  = j, then Yj =   and p(Yj|    S
j ) = 0. In this case, the Receiver’s action   aj will
never be chosen and the n
| | signals devoted to distinguish    S
j from the other
prototypes will be wasted. To avoid this ine ciency, the corpus is modiﬁed
such that the 0’s signals used in those prototypes sequences such that p(Yj|
   S
j ) = 0 are reassigned to the other prototypes.
Example 4. Consider the incomplete information Sender-Receiver game
with   = { 1, 2, 3}, where nature chooses  j according to law q =( q1,q 2,q 3)=
(0.1,0.3,0.6). Payo s for the three states of nature are M1 = 3, M2 = 20 and
M3 = 100.




 2   1
 3  2  
 
 
For n = 3, then m = n
| | = 1, and the sets of pragmatic variations Y1
and Y2 are empty, the corresponding actions   a1 ,   a2 will never be chosen and
the communication game will be equivalent to the silent game, where no-
communication takes place. On the other hand, for n   9, and then m   3, all
the pragmatic variations are non-empty and the Receiver’s three actions will
be played with ex-ante positive probability.
24For the intermediate value of n = 6 (m = 2), the matrix of vicinity bounds,












In this case the prototype    S
1 = 001111 is unable to generate a meaning (the
corresponding Receiver’s action   a1 ) and the two 0-signals of the sequence
devoted to distinguish it from the others are wasted. To avoid this ine ciency,
players could act as if they were playing another (truncated) game, with only
two states of nature  2 and  3, each of them taking place with probabilities
  q2 = q2 + q1
q2
q2+q3 and   q3 = q3 + q1
q3
q2+q3, respectively. In this case the new
corpus consists of the two standard prototypes    S
2 = 000111,    S
3 = 111000 and
no signal is wasted now.
To formalize this idea, consider game  , with   = { 1,..., | |} , where
 j is chosen by nature with probability qj, and its communication extension
by adding n uses of the noisy channel  , denoted by  n
  . Let as assume,
without loss of generality, that p(Y1|   S
1)   p(Y2|   S
2)   ...   p(Y| ||    S
| |) and
let j0 = min{j =1 ,...,| ||p(Yj|   S
j ) > 0}.
Given   and  n
 , deﬁne the auxiliary truncated game   = { 1,..., j0}
where nature chooses state  j (and the the game  j) with probability
  qj = qj +
qj  j0
l=0 ql
| |  
k=j0+1
qk   qj
for j =1 ,...,j0.
Let    n
  the corresponding extended game and    S
j , j =1 ,...,j0, the standard
prototypes of the new corpus. Since p(Yj|   S
j )   p(Yj|   S
j ) for j =1 ,...,j0 and
p(Yj|   S
j ) = 0 for j = j0 +1 ,...,| |, we have that
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and no message is wasted trying to distinguish among actions that will never
be chosen.
256 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that pragmatic Languages with a universal grammar are a
powerful coordination device when there may exist communication misunder-
standings. Reduced dictionaries20, simple grammars and standard prototypes
help individuals to coordinate in spite of initial misunderstandings. This is
accomplished by facilitating the inference of meaning and thus generating the
pragmatic variations around each standard prototype. Our approach sheds
light to the formation not only of target-oriented languages, but also to spe-
ciﬁc ”organization” languages, professional languages, etc.
When considering real life time-constraints, a language with structure based
on di erent orderings of the enumerations turns out to be more useful for learn-
ing purposes rather than for meaning inference. Nevertheless, languages with
universal grammars appear to have emerged because they ensure the successful
transmission of languages themselves. The Chinese Language is an example of
how the successful transmission of information shapes some language charac-
teristics. Spoken Chinese is distinguished by its high level of internal diversity
(it is pragmatic and very local) though all spoken varieties of Chinese21 are
tonal and analytic; dictionaries are small with 6 vowels and 15 consonants
and the grammar is compositional. On the contrary, written Chinese is highly
complex: it comprises the written symbols used to represent spoken Chinese.
Chinese characters do not constitute an alphabet or a compact syllabary; they
are instead built up from simple parts representing objects or abstracts no-
tions. There are around 47.035 ideograms or hanzy, but Chinese people do not
manage more than 8000 of them.
One of the frequently asked questions in studies on language origins and
evolution is how universal grammar structures in human languages could have
emerged. One line of research assumes that such structures emerged from ex-
ploiting regularities found in protolanguages. Universal structures in language
could have emerged when the learning examples do not cover the entire lan-
guage (i.e., there was a bottleneck on the transmission of language). Other re-
searchers have assumed that the ability to use syntax has evolved as a biological
20Nowak, Krakauer and Dress (1999) argue that, because of the noise, the ﬁtness of a
language cannot be increased arbitrarily by just adding more signals. On the contrary, the
ﬁtness can be increased by combining a small number of signal into words. This is called
”phonemes” by linguists. Modern human languages have a limited number of phonemes: as
reported by Nowak, Krakauer and Dress, all of 317 languages in the University of California
Los Angeles Segment Inventory Database (UPSID) have between 11 and 141 phonemes, but
70% of these languages have between 20 and 37 phonemes.
21The standardized form of spoken Chinese is the Standard Mandarin.
26adaptation. In their seminal article which re-ignited much of recent burgeon-
ing interest in language evolution, Pinker and Bloom (1990) argue persuasively
that ”a specialization for grammar evolved by a conventional neo-Darwinian
process” (page 707), suggesting that humans have evolved an innate, genet-
ically speciﬁed module in the brain, which speciﬁes a formal coding of the
principles of Universal Grammar. These authors are ﬁrmly of the opinion that
the selective advantage of the communicative function of language can explain
the evolution of the language faculty itself. But, Chomsky (1988), perhaps
somewhat surprisingly, given his introduction of the very idea of Universal
Grammar, argues that the role of natural selection in language evolution is
very limited. Much more e ort in computer simulations of language evolution
has to be done to give more precise answers.
To conclude, we would like to call the attention about the way of precisely
deﬁning the notions of a language and a ”common language” from an economic
viewpoint. As it is obvious, di erent models may need di erent notions of both
languages and common languages. Therefore, much work is needed to deﬁne
some unifying rules which are still lacking.
7 References
Azrieli, Y. and E. Lehrer (2007): “Categorization generated by extended pro-
totypes: An axiomatic approach”, Journal of Mathematical Psychology 51,
14-28
Balinski, M. and R. Laraki (2007,a): “Election by Majority Judgement:
Experimental Evidence”, Cahier du Laboratoire d’ Econometrie, ´ Ecole Poly-
thecnique, no 2007-28.
Balinski, M. and R. Laraki (2007,b): “A theory of measuring, electing
and ranking”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A., vol.
104(2007), 8720-8725.
Batali, J. (1998): “Computational simulations of the emergence of gram-
mar”. In J.R. Hurford, M. Studdert-Kennedy, and C. Knight (editors), Ap-
proaches to the evolution of language: Social and cognitive bases, 405-426.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Blume, A. (2005): “A Learning-E ciency Explanation of Structure in Lan-
guage”, Theory and Decision, 57, 265-285.
Blume, A. and O. J. Board (2008): “Intentional Vagueness”, mimeo.
Blume, A., O. J. Board and K. Kawamura (2007): “Noisy Talk”, Theoret-
ical Economics, Vol. 2, 395-440.
27Chomsky, N. (1988): Language and problems of knowledge, Cambridge,
MA. The MIT Press.
Crawford, V. and J. Sobel (1982): “Strategic Information Transmission”,
Econometrica, Vol. 50, 1431-1451.
Cr´ emer, J., L. Garicano and A. Prat (2007): “Language and the Theory of
the Firm”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(1), 373-408.
Demichelis, S and J. Weibull (2008): “Language, meaning and games: A
model of communication, coordination and evolution”, American Economic
Review, forthcoming.
G¨ ardenfors, P. (2000): “Conceptual Spaces”. Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press.
Grice, H.P. (1975): “Logic and Conversation”. In P. Cole and J.L. Morgan
(editors), Syntax and semantics, vol. 3, 41-58. New York. Academic Press.
J¨ ager, G. (2007): “The evolution of convex categories”, Linguist and Philos,
30, 551-564. Published online: 26 March 2008.
Hern´ andez, P., Urbano, A. and J. Vila (2009): “Nash Equilibrium and
information transmission coding and decoding rules”, mimeo, University of
Valencia.
Kirby, S. (2002): “Learning, bottlenecks and the evolution of recursive
syntax”. In E. Bricoe, editor, Linguistics evolution through language acqui-
sition: Formal and Computational models, 173-203, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
Kirby, S. (2007): “The evolution of the meaning-espace structure through
iterated learning”, In Lyon, C., Nehaniv, C., and Cangelosi, A., editors, Emer-
gence of Communication and Language, 253-268, Spring-Verlang.
Koessler, F. (2001): “Common Knowledge and Consensus with Nosy Com-
munication”, Mathematical Social Sciences, 42(2), 139-159.
Koessler, F. (2004): “Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games”,
Games and Economic Behavior, 48(2), 292-320.
Lipman, B., and D. Seppi (1995): “Robust Inference in Communication
Games with Partial Peovability”, Journal of Economic Theory 66, 370-405.
Nowak, M. A. and D. C. Krakauer (1999): “The evolution of language”,
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, vol. 96, 8028-8033.
Nowak, M. A., D.C. Krakauer and A. Dress (1999): “An error limit for the
evolution of language”, Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences,
266, 2131-2136.
Pinker, S and P. Bloom (1990): “Natural language and natural selection”,
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13, 707-784.
28Reiter, E. and S. Sripada (2002): “Human Variation and Lexical Choice”,
Association for Computational Linguistics, 28, 545-553.
Rubinstein, A. (1996): “Why are certain properties of binary relations
relatively more common in natural language, Econometrica, Vol. 64, 343-355.
Rubinstein, A. (2000): Economics and Language, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Selten, R.and M. Warglien (2007): “The emergence of simple languages in
an experimental coordination game”, PNAS, vol. 104 (18), 7361-7366.
Shannon, C.E. (1948): “A Mathematical Theory of Communication,” Bell
System Technical Journal, 27, 379–423; 623–656.
Smith, A.D.M. (2003): Evolving Communication through the inference of
Meaning, PhD thesis, University of Edinburg.
Vogt, P. (2005): “The emergence of compositional structures in perceptu-
ally grounded language games”, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 167(1-2): 206-242.
8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: If  0 +  1 < 1, then p(1|0) =  0 < 1    1 = p(1|1)
and p(0|1) =  1 < 1    0 = p(0|0). Clearly, the conditional probability of
receiving a 0, when a 0 was sent is higher than the one of receiving a 0 when a
1 was sent, therefore,
p(0|0)
p(0|1)  = 1. And similarly for the conditional probability
of receiving a 1, i.e.,
p(1|1)
p(1|0)  = 1. Thus, information transmission is informative









Now, let r = 0 and   r = 1, s = 0 and   s = 1, then p(r|s)=p(0|0) = 1    0,
p(  r|  s)=p(1|1) = 1    1, p(r|  s)=p(0|1) =  1 and p(  r|s)=p(1|0) =  0. Let


















p(  r|  s)
Similarly, letting now r = 1 and   r = 0, s = 1 and   s = 0, then p(r|s)=
p(1|1) = 1    1, p(  r|  s)=p(0|0) = 1    0,p(r|  s)=p(1|0) =  0 and p(  r|s)=
p(0|1) =  1. As above, since (1    0)(1    1) >  1 0, then p(r|s)p(  r|  s) >
p(r|  s)p(  r|s) and output signal 1 is more favorable than output signal 0, for
input signal 1.
29If  0+ 1 > 1, then p(1|0) =  0 > 1  1 = p(1|1) and p(0|1) =  1 > 1  0 =
p(0|0). In words, the conditional probability of receiving a 0, when a 0 was
sent is lower than the one of receiving a 0 when a 1 was sent. As above, it
can be easily proven again that information transmission is informative: i.e.,
p(s|r)
p(  s|r) =
p(r|s)p(s)
p(r|  s)p(  s)  =
p(s)
p(  s), and that output signal 0 is now more favorable than
output signal 1, for input signal 1.
Finally notice that when  0 +  1 = 1, then p(1|0) =  0 =1   1 = p(1|1)
and p(0|1) =  1 =1   0 = p(0|0). Now input signals are not informative
at all, since the conditional probability of receiving a 0, when a 0 was sent is
equal to the one of receiving a 0 when a 1 was sent.
Proof of Lemma 2: 1) Recall that    S
k = {x
j
k}j {1,...,n} and    S







k  = 1 but the blocks k and k  (i.e. j such that (i   1)m   1  
j   im for i   {k,k }). Therefore, the Hamming distance in the block l is:





Iy(l 1)m+j =(   S







Iy(l 1)m+j =(   S
k )(l 1)m+j = hl(   
S
k ,y)
2) Let us compute hk(   S
k,y)+hk(   S
k ,y) if k  = k . Notice that:
{x
j
k}j {(k 1)m+1,...,km} = 0 and {x
j
k }j {(k 1)m+1,...,km} = 1, then
hk(   
S















Proof that sets Yl, l = {1,...,| |}, are a true partition of Y n: Given
the description of Yl in the main text, without loss of generality, suppose on
the contrary that Y1   Y2  =  .
a. Let 1   ˜  2 and y   Y1   Y2. Then,
h1(   
S
1,y)+h2(   
S
1,y)   C12, and h2(   
S
2,y)+h1(   
S
2,y)   C21
and adding h1(   S
1,y)+h1(   S
2,y)+h2(   S
1,y)+h2(   S
2,y)   C12 + C21, that by
Lemma 1(2) is m + m   2m   1, a contradiction.
b. Let 1 /   ˜  2 and y   Y1   Y2.
h1(   
S
1,y)+h2(   
S
1,y)   C12, and h2(   
S
2,y)+h1(   
S
2,y) <C 21
30and adding h1(   S
1,y)+h1(   S
2,y)+h2(   S
1,y)+h2(   S
2,y) <C 12 + C21, that by
Lemma 1(2) is 2m<2m, a contradiction again.
Proof of Proposition 1: By Bayes’s Theorem,
p(   S
l |y)
p(   S
k |y) =
p(y|   S
l )c(   S
l )
p(y)
p(y|   S






p(y|   S
l )
p(y|   S
k ).
The conditional probability of the channel to generate output y if message
   S
l is sent can be written as:


















hl(   S
l ,y)
0 (1    0)
m hl(   S
l ,y))





h (   S
l ,y)
1 (1    1)
m h (   S
l ,y)
 
and the conditional probability to generate the same y if message    S
k is sent
instead is:
p(y|   
S
k)= 
hk(   S
k ,y)
0 (1    0)
m hk(   S
k ,y)





h (   S
k ,y)
1 (1    1)
m h (   S
k ,y)
 
Consider the likelihood ratio of messages    S
l and    S
k, when y is realized,
p(   S
l |y)
p(   S
k |y). It is not di cult to show by some cumbersome algebra that this ratio
can be splitted in three separated terms.
p(   S
l |y)





  Ratio1   Ratio2   Ratio3, where
Ratio1: Measures the probability of transformation of the 0’s bits in block




hl(   S
l ,y)
0 (1    0)m hl(   S
l ,y)
 
hk(   S
k ,y)




hl(   S
l ,y)
0 (1    0)m hl(   S
l ,y)
 
m hk(   S
l ,y)





1    0
 hl(   S
l ,y)+hk(   S
l ,y) m
31Ratio2: Refers to the probability of transformation of the 1’s bits in block




hk(   S
l ,y)
1 (1    1)m hk(   S
l ,y)
 
hl(   S
k ,y)




m hl(   S
l ,y)
1 (1    1)hk(   S
l ,y)
 
hl(   S
k ,y)





1    1
 hl(   S
l ,y)+hk(   S
l ,y) m
Ratio3: Refers to the probability of transformation of the 1’s bits in the
remaining blocks (all the blocks but l and k), then, using lemma lemma2, part
1
Ratio3 =




h (   S
l ,y)
1 (1    1)m h (   S
l ,y)
 
h (   S
k ,y)
1 (1    1)m h (   S
k ,y)
=1
Putting these three ratios together, we have that
p(   S
l |y)







1    0
 hl(   S
l ,y)+hk(   S
l ,y) m  
 1
1    1
 hl(   S







1    0
 1
1    1
 hl(   S
l ,y)+hk(   S
l ,y) m
,
and the proposition holds.
Proof of the Theorem 1:
The Receiver’s condition: Given the Sender equilibrium strategy {   S
j }j,
and the Receiver’s information set Y n, consider the realization y   Y n. The
Receiver’s strategy is deﬁned by:    R
y =   al   y   Yl , where for each l  
{1,...,| |}, and ˜  l = {k   {1,...,| |} such that qlMl  = qkMk},
Yl = {y   Y
n| hl(   
S
l ,y)) + hk(   
S
l ,y))   Clk, for all k   ˜  l
hl(   
S
l ,y)) + hk
 (   
S
l ,y))   Clk
 , for all k
 
  /   ˜  l , k
 
<l
hl(   
S
l ,y)) + hk
 (   
S
l ,y)) <C lk
 , for all k
 
/   ˜  l , k
 
>l }











32with associated payo   R
y ({   S
j }j,  al)=
 | |
j=1 p(   S
j |y)u(  al, j)=p(   S
l )|y)Ml.
Consider any other strategy a   =   al and suppose that its associated payo 
is higher than under   al. Then,  R
y ({   S
j }j,a  ) >  R
y ({   S
j }j,  al), or
| |  
j=1
p(   
S
j |y)u(  a , j) >
| |  
j=1
p(   
S
j |y)u(  al, j),
which by the linearity of  R
y in probabilities p(   S
j |y), is equal to,
p(   
S






p(   S
l |y)
p(   S
 |y)






1    0
 1
1    1
 hl(   S
l ,y)+h (   S
l ,y) m




> (hl(   
S
l ,y)+h (   
S
l ,y)   m)Ln
 0
1    0
 1
1    1











< 0. Then, the
above inequality is equivalent to:
hl(   
S











+ m = Cl 
by the deﬁnition of Cl . But this contradicts that y   Yl, since by deﬁnition
Yl = {y   Y n| hl( S
l ,y)) + hk( S
l ,y))   Clk, for all k  = l}, in particular for
k =  . Therefore for each y   Y n there is no proﬁtable deviation from    R
y ,
and    R
y is a best response to {   S
j }j.
The Sender’s condition. Truth-telling: The Sender’s strategy at state  j
consists of sending a message and thus it su ces to show that there is no
proﬁtable deviation by sending another message di erent from    S
j , when R
plays {   R
y }y. The associated payo  of    S
j at state  j when the Receiver plays




j (   
S





p(y|   
S





p(y|   
S
j )
33since u(at, j) = 0 for all at  =   aj.
Consider the associated payo  of sending any other message x   Xn,
 
y Y n






Let f = h(   S
j ,x) be the Hamming distance between messages    S
j and x. We
can construct a sequence of messages { 0, 1,..., f} such that  i   Xn, 0 =
   S
j , f = x satisfying that, for all d =0 ,...,f   1,
h(   
S
j , d+1)=h(   
S
j , d) + 1 and h( d, d+1) = 1
This sequence transforms message    S
j into message x by only changing one















































Let us consider two di erent cases:
Case 1:( j   1)m   1   id   jm. The mismatch occurs at block j and as
y   Yj, then the element  
id
d coincides with the element yid = 0 and  
id
d+1 =1 .
























1    1
  1
Notice that there exists at least an element y   Yj with yid = 0 and the
ratio
1  0




 1   1.
34Case 2: id < (j  1)m 1 or id > jm. The mismatch occurs in a di erent
block of j and as above y   Yj, then the element  
id
d coincides with the element
yid = 1 and  
id























1    1
 0
  1
The set of elements in Yj such that yid = 1 has cardinality greater than




 0   1. From the above reasoning, the




y Yj p(y|   S
j )  
 
y Yj p(y|x) and the associated payo s for
both messages    S
j and x verify the condition Mj
 
y Yj p(y|   S
j )   Mj
 
y Yj p(y|x)
that closes the proof. Hence, for each    S
j is a best response to {   R
y }y.
Since at each state  j, the Sender pure strategy    S
j is a best response to
{   R
y }y and for each y   Y n, the Receiver pure strategy    R
y is a best response
to {   S
j }j, then the pair of tuples ({   S
j }j,{   R
y }y) is a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium of  n
 .
Proof of proposition 2: Without loss of generality, let us assume that
j = 1 and C12   C13  ,...,  C1| |. Under these assumptions the theorem is
satisﬁed whenever:
p(Y1|   
S
1)   1    
c12+1
0  ( 0, 1)
where  ( 0, 1) is a polynomial on  0 and  1.
Notice that y   Y1 if and only if h1(   S
1,y)+hl(   S
1,y)   C1l, for all l =
2,...,| |. In particular h1(   S
1,y)   C12. Then, at least m   C12 of the ﬁrst
bits on    S
1 are properly transmitted and the number of 1 s in the ﬁrst m bits
of y is equal to or lower than C12. As a consequence, the maximum number
of mismatches between y and    S
1 in blocks 1 and l (l =2 ,...,| |), say C1l,
are distributed in such a way that at most C12 of them are placed in block 1,
meanwhile at least m C12 of such mismatches are placed in block l. Since the
probability of a mismatch in block one is given by  0 and that of a mismatch
in any other block by  1, we have that
p(Y1|   
S










(1    0)
m   
 
0
| |  
l =2






(1    1)
m  l  
 l 
1






(1    1)m  l  
 l 
1 , we can write the
above expression as
p(Y1|   
S










(1    0)
m   
 
0
| |  
l =2
 
 1  
m  





(1    1)












(1    0)
m   
 
0
| |  
l =2
 
 1  
m  





(1    1)












(1    0)
m   
 
0
| |  
l =2
 









(1    1)
m  l  











(1    0)
m   
 
0
| |  
l =2
 
1    
C12+1  
1  l ( 1)
 
where  l ( 1) denotes a polynomial on  1. On the other hand, given  , we
have that
| |  
l =2
 
1    
C12+1  
1  l ( 1)
 
=1   
C12+1  
1   ( 1)
where   ( 1) is again a polynomial in  1. Hence
p(Y1|   
S










(1    0)




1    
C12+1  









(1    0)









(1    0)




1   ( 1)
36By the fact that 1 = ((1  0)+ 0)m, the above expression can alternatively
be written as
p(Y1|   
S










(1    0)









(1    0)




1   ( 1)









(1    0)
m   








(1    0)




1   ( 1)
=1    
C12+1







(1    0)




1   ( 1)







(1    0)












(1    0)














(1    0)
m    ( 1)
=  
C12+1
0  ( 0, 1)
and the probability p(Y1|   S
1) is given by
p(Y1|   
S
1)=p(y   Y1|   
S
1)
  1    
C12+1
0  ( 0)    
C12+1
0  ( 0, 1)
=1    
C12+1
0 [ ( 0)+ ( 0, 1)]
Finally, deﬁning the polynomial   as follows
 ( 0, 1)= ( 0)+ ( 0, 1)
the proof is completed.
37